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Abstract 
Institutional Anomie Theory argues instrumental crime and violence are a result of 
weakened social controls that are caused by an imbalance of values favoring the 
economy. Anomie causes a new moral standard to emerge, one that encourages 
normative flexibility to achieve goals. The emphasis on the economy permeates into 
noneconomic institutions that cause them to adopt economic principles and weakens 
them. The result of this process is that individuals may develop market mentality. Past 
research has considered normative flexibility to be embedded within market mentality. 
However, this assumption has not been formally tested. The concepts may be 
theoretically distinct and empirically distinct. A formal test of this assumption would 
provide a better understanding of how market mentality relates to deviance and crime. 
The current study tests if market mentality mediates the relationship between normative 
flexibility and delinquency using a sample of 2,748 adolescents from thirty-one schools 
across the U.S. A factor analysis found normative flexibility and market mentality are 
distinct theoretical concepts. A multiple regression found normative flexibility is a 
significant predictor of market mentality. A series of negative binomial regressions did 
not find evidence that market mentality mediates neutralization, property crimes, and 
violent crimes. Future research should regard market mentality and normative flexibility 
as distinct concepts and they should not be lumped together. 
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Institutional Anomie Theory: Does Market Mentality Mediate Normative 
Flexibility? 
 Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) proposed Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) to 
explain the high rate of violent crime and property crime the U.S. was experiencing in the 
1990’s. According to the theory, an imbalance of values favoring economic goals 
weakens non-economic institutions and values, resulting in anomie. Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1994) state, Anomie is the creation of a new moral standard. This moral 
standard has its roots in capitalistic values and encourages “normative flexibility in the 
pursuit of dominant cultural goals” (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994, p. 62). Therefore, 
engaging in morally questionable acts is acceptable if the purpose is to increase wealth. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on capitalistic values, takes precedence over non-economic 
values such as solidarity, social support, and benevolence, causing a person to adopt 
market values (Hövermann, Grob, and Messner, 2015).  
 While Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) state normative flexibility is utilized to 
achieve dominant cultural goals, this component has not been examined as a distinct 
theoretical concept in the IAT literature. Instead, past research has assumed normative 
flexibility is embedded within market mentality. This is because it is assumed that as 
individuals adopt market mentality their boundaries of acceptable actions and behaviors 
that can be justified are simultaneously expanded (Hövermann & Messner, 2019). Rather 
than normative flexibility being embedded within market mentality, it is reasonable to 
suspect that they are distinct theoretical processes. If this were the case, then a weakening 
of social controls i.e. social constraints would expand the boundaries of potential actions 
for individuals, freeing them to develop normative flexibility. The development of 
normative flexibility may then lead individuals to justify adopting market values over 
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traditional solidarity values thereby leading to a market mentality mindset. In other 
words, the adoption of normative flexibility would be a prerequisite to adopting market 
mentality. Because of this, it is likely normative flexibility and market mentality are 
empirically distinct as well as theoretically distinct.  If this is the case, market mentality 
would be a mediating variable between normative flexibility and property crimes and 
violent crimes.  
 The purpose of this paper is to test if normative flexibility and market mentality 
are distinct theoretical concepts. If the concepts are distinct this paper will test if market 
mentality mediates normative flexibility and leads to increases in property crime, 
fighting, and violent crime for adolescents. To accomplish this, first, the literature on IAT 
is reviewed. Second, this paper argues the processes of justification that occurs with 
normative flexibility are actually Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization. 
Therefore, this paper argues IAT and Matza’s (1964) techniques of neutralization are 
compatible, and neutralization theory can be used to explain the process through which 
individuals develop market mentality. Third, using wave six of the Gang Resistance 
Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.) data, a factor analysis is performed to determine if 
normative flexibility is distinct from market mentality. In addition twelve negative 
binomial regression models are run to determine if market mentality mediates normative 
flexibility, which, then leads to adolescent property crime, fighting, and violent crime.   
 A Review of the Institutional Anomie Theory Literature 
 IAT was originally formulated as a macro-level theory centered on Durkheim’s 
(1897/1951) second conceptualization of anomie, and has traditionally been tested by 
comparing crime rates of different countries (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995; Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1997; Savolainen, 2000). According to Durkheim (1897/1951) anomie occurs 
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“when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions” 
weakening the moral regulating force in society. As a result, people begin aspiring 
towards individualistic goals, which creates additional stress on the remaining regulating 
forces of society (Durkheim, 1897/1951). IAT assumes rapid occurring historical events 
within the United States such as the Great Depression, rapid technological innovations, 
WWII, and the prosperity of the 1950’s through 1970’s resulted in anomie and lead to a 
breakdown of the traditional moral order. As a result, people began to aspire toward 
capitalistic goals that created a new moral standard rooted in capitalistic values. As a 
result, countries with a high level of anomie will have high levels of property and violent 
crime, whereas countries with low levels of anomie will have low levels of property and 
violent crime.     
 However, research has expanded the scope of IAT to the individual level. For 
example, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) explained that IAT can be measured on 
the individual level. This is because institutions are made up of concrete individual actors 
who “produce and reproduce institutional dynamics that operate at the macro level” (p. 
165). Muftić (2006) surveyed undergraduates and found American students placed a 
higher importance on economic goals than foreign-born students, and were more likely to 
engage in cheating behaviors. Stults and Falco (2013) examined the effect of high school 
seniors’ commitment to noneconomic institutions and commitment to economic goals, on 
violence theft and substance use. Students who were more attached to economic goals 
were more likely to engage in violence and substance use. This finding indicated that IAT 
is not limited to examining only violence and property crime, but can also explain various 
types of adolescent delinquency. Rosenberger (2016) examined if television consumption 
increases adherence with the American culture and criminal behavior. Following past 
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research (Chamlin and Cochran, 1997), Rosenberger (2016) used altruistic behavior and 
debt to measure an individual’s attachment to the American dream. It was found that 
television consumption is associated with increased levels of isolation, criminal behavior, 
and a decrease in altruism (Rosenberger, 2016). 
 Hövermann, Groß, and Messner (2015) examined if an institutional imbalance 
favoring the economy produces anti-social attitudes and behaviors in individuals who 
hold capitalistic values over pro-social solidarity values in Germany. To test this, the 
authors characterized individuals who hold capitalistic values as having “marketized 
mentality.” Marketized mentality is characterized when individuals consider personal 
achievement, utilitarian motives, egotistical individualization, self-interest, competition, 
insensitivity to means, and a fetishism of money, as moral standards that are emphasized 
over pro-social solidarity values such as altruism, equal worth, equal treatment of all 
groups, cooperation, an emphasis on family, friends, and non-economic goals. The 
authors found a significant negative correlation between market mentality and solidarity. 
This indicates the degree that market mentality is accepted is inversely related to the 
degree of solidarity values a person holds. Hövermann, et al., (2015) also found that 
individuals with market mentality are more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes against 
groups who are financially disadvantaged. Hövermann, Messner, and Zick (2015) also 
examined this relationship, and found weakened non-economic institutions are strongly 
correlated with weakened social relations, weakened political relationships, weakened 
families, anomia, and marketized mentality. Furthermore, marketized mentality is 
significantly related to a devaluation of unemployed groups, homelessness, and disabled 
persons (Hövermann, Messner, and Zick, 2015).   
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 Groß, Hövermann, and Messner (2018) surveyed students across 69 different 
schools in Germany to test marketized mentality at the student level and if a competitive 
school culture increases delinquency levels. Market mentality was measured by an 
egoistic scale which consisted of three questions asking about self-interest, dominating 
others, and personal success. Solidarity was measured by student responses to questions 
about altruistic and self-transcending values. The school culture was measured by how 
competitive students perceived the school to be. The authors found market mentality is 
associated with increased levels of delinquency, and a competitive school culture is 
associated with increased levels of violence for students who are underperforming.  
 Zito (2018) examined the World Values Survey (WVS) to test if IAT impacts the 
justification to commit crime. Justification to commit crime was measured by examining 
how justified morally dubious acts are in certain situations. Zito (2018) found that 
monetary fetishism predicted justification of morally dubious acts cross-nationally. 
Hövermann and Messner (2019) expanded on Zito (2018) and found in a comparison of 
countries, that institutional imbalance was associated with market mentality and an 
increased likelihood of justifying instrumental offenses.   
Marketized mentality is the conceptual linchpin that connects institutional anomie 
theory to the individual level (Groß, Hövermann, and Messner, 2018). It is a latent 
construct that can be inferred by looking at attitudinal, behavioral, and ideological 
variables (Hövermann, Groß, and Messner, 2016). However, market mentality is a new 
concept and standardized scales for its measurement have not yet been developed. As a 
result, there have been numerous variables measures in various scales. For example, past 
scales have examined questions asking about individual attitudes regarding success, 
achievement, power, egotism, individualism, monetary fetishism, market role 
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performance, self-serving attitudes, moral attitudes, solidarity levels, benevolence, 
altruism, and universalism. Prior literature has typically examined several of these listed 
themes (Hövermann, Groß, and Messner, 2015; Hövermann, Messner, and Zick, 2015; 
Hövermann, Groß, and Messner, 2016; Groß, Hövermann, and Messner, 2018; 
Hövermann and Messner, 2019).  
 Furthermore, the concept of normative flexibility is thought to be embedded 
within market mentality, yet, this assumption has not been tested as normative flexibility 
has not been formally operationalized at the individual level or measured in the market 
mentality scales. It is important this is tested as Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) 
clarified the likelihood of criminal acts is greatest in individuals who use morally flexible 
means to achieve goals. However, all prior studies that have examined the individual 
level effects of IAT have either examined the amount of time students have been in the 
U.S. (Muftić, 2006), the level of integration with non-economic institutions (Stults and 
Falco, 2013), television consumption (Rosenberger, 2016), or the presence of solidarity 
values versus market values (Hövermann, et al., 2015; Groß, et al., 2018). 
The current study helps to overcome a past limitation of varying market mentality 
questions in the individual level IAT literature. This is accomplished by performing a 
factor analysis on similar questions that have been used to measure market mentality in 
the past to identify which are key to the construct. Normative flexibility will also be 
examined because it is likely normative flexibility is theoretically distinct and empirically 
distinct from market mentality. This is because anomie weakens non-economic 
institutions and thus social controls over individual actors. As social controls weaken the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviors are expanded. Because of this, previous actions that 
were not thinkable for individual actors can be justified. For example, individuals can 
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justify prioritizing self-advancement over the family and friends, thereby leading to a 
market mentality mindset. Therefore, normative flexibility may be used to explain the 
process through which market mentality is adopted. Once market mentality is adopted 
and embraced, the individual is no longer restrained by solidarity values or feelings of 
benevolence. As a side effect, individuals are free to commit property crime and violence 
without concern for others. 
 Techniques of Neutralization 
 As mentioned earlier, the IAT literature has not examined how normative 
flexibility and market mentality relate to one another. It is important the relationship is 
understood as it may provide a clearer understanding of how market mentality leads to 
increased levels of crime. Normative flexibility has not been formally operationalized in 
the IAT literature. Hövermann & Messner, (2019) describe normative flexibility as a 
process of stretching the boundaries that of acts that can be justified. Yet, this description 
is not novel because neutralization theory already explains how justifications relate to 
criminal outcomes. Because of this, Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) concept of 
normative flexibility is synonymous with Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of 
neutralization. It is theoretically appropriate to utilize neutralization theory in IAT as 
Matza (1964) states, drift theory falls under the paradigm of control theories making both 
theories compatible. If normative flexibility and neutralization were not the same 
theoretical concept, one would have to explain how normative flexibility lead to criminal 
outcomes without describing a process of justifications or neutralizations. Because the 
ideas are theoretically synonymous, techniques of neutralization should be used to 
explain less developed concepts of other control theories such as normative flexibility in 
Institutional Anomie Theory.  
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 Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed neutralization theory an alternative to sub-
cultural theories of delinquency (Murray and Topalli, 2014). According to Sykes and 
Matza (1957) techniques of neutralization include a denial of responsibility, denial of 
injury, denial of a victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher 
loyalties. According to the theory, these techniques are learned and used to neutralize 
existing social controls, enabling the user to drift in and out of delinquency. Furthermore, 
these techniques are only brief shields to the dominant normative system, and do not 
result in “the creation of an opposing ideology” (Sykes and Matza (1957, p. 669). 
Furthermore, Sykes and Matza (1957) explain that because juveniles still experience 
guilt, it is evidence that the techniques of neutralization only weaken the existing social 
controls; they do not completely neutralize the normative order.
 An important difference between drift theory and IAT, is that drift assumes the 
techniques of neutralization are first learned, and then used to weaken social controls 
allowing individuals to engage in deviance. IAT assumes social controls are already 
weakened because of economic values penetrating non-economic institutions and 
weakening them (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). The two theories have different 
explanations for how neutralizations develop and how criminal acts occur, making them 
appear independent from one another. However, the two theories are compatible if Sykes 
and Matza’s (1957) proposition that the technique of neutralizations are learned, is 
expanded on with the following statement. Techniques of neutralization develop through 
a process of weakening of social controls that expands the boundaries of actions 
susceptible to neutralization. This proposition allows the techniques of neutralization to 
fit within IAT in a parsimonious manner. This is because IAT is built on the idea that 
anomie results in the creation of a competing moral standard in society that encourages 
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normative flexibility. It follows that anomie weakens the social constraints of 
noneconomic institutions causing individuals to develop techniques of 
neutralization/normative flexibility. This allows individuals to neutralize personal 
attachments and adopt the anomic moral standard of market values.  
 Because of this, in a marketized society, it appears that Matza’s (1964) techniques 
of neutralization create a natural pathway that allows individuals to develop market 
mentality. In short, the anomic moral standard of market values permeating non-
economic institutions and weakening them, in combination with techniques of 
neutralization, allow individuals to adopt a new ideological view that is market mentality. 
Therefore, flexibility is an important variable that needs to be tested in IAT models, as it 
would potentially explain how market values and market mentality can lead to deviance 
on an individual level. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining if 
neutralization mediates the relationship between market mentality and delinquency. The 
Hypothesis states:  
H1: Market Mentality mediates the relationship  





 This study will utilize wave six of the Gang Resistance Education And Training 
(G.R.E.A.T.) data. G.R.E.A.T. is a primary prevention program aimed at preventing 
youth from becoming involved in gang and delinquent activities. The program was 
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originally developed in 1991 by law enforcement in Phoenix Arizona to reduce the 
number of adolescents who were becoming involved in gangs. The program involved 
middle school students, parents, and law enforcement. Because of its positive reception 
by the community, the program was adopted throughout the United States (Esbensen, et 
al., 2011). In response to an NIJ initiative, the program was evaluated in the 1990’s and 
again from 2006-2011. In the most recent evaluation, parents, law enforcement officers, 
and about 3,800 adolescents from thirty one schools in seven cities: Greeley, CO; 
Chicago, IL; Albuquerque, NM; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Nashville, TN; and the 
Dallas/Fort Worth area, TX. Within the schools, classrooms were assigned randomly to 
the control group or to receive the G.R.E.A.T. program. Researchers obtained parental 
consent for 3,820 students or 77.9% of all potential students. Students were surveyed in 
six waves. The first wave occurred immediately after the program. The second wave 
occurred six months after the program, and each subsequent wave occurred annually. 
This study utilizes wave six because the adolescents are the oldest, on average sixteen 
years of age, and it was expected older students were more likely to report market 
mentality. By wave six, 1,072 participants had dropped out and the number of 
participants in the final wave was 2,748.  
 Variables   
Dependent Variables 
 The first dependent variable examines whether adolescents had attacked someone 
with a weapon. The second dependent variable examines whether adolescents had hit 
someone with the intent to hurt him or her. The third dependent variable examines 
burglary with the question have you “gone into or tried to go into a building to steal 
something?” The fourth dependent variable examines vandalism with the question “Have 
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you purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not belong to you,” The fifth 
dependent variable examines stealing something worth more than $50. The sixth 
dependent variable examines stealing something worth less than $50. All of the 
dependent variables examine where adolescents have engaged in a certain delinquent 
behavior in the past six months on a zero to 11 scale, with 11 indicating more than ten 
times. Independent Variables  
Eight potential market mentality questions were selected from the G.R.E.A.T 
data. The questions selected are theoretically similar to Hövermann, et al., (2015), 
Hövermann, et al., (2016), and Groß, Hövermann, and Messner (2018) as the 
questionnaire includes questions about excessive individualism, monetary fetishism, and 
prioritizing ones self before others. There have been a variety of ways these authors have 
measured market mentality. For example, Hövermann, Groß, Zick, & Messner (2015) 
measured market mentality examining success “(It’s not important how you win but that 
you win),” individualism “(I think of myself without much regard for others),” monetary 
fetishism “(No matter where it is from, having money is important)” and market-
dominated role performance “(If working overtime is necessary to get ahead, I would 
spend less time with my friends/family).” Hövermann, Groß, and Messner (2016) 
operationalized market mentality using Schwartz’s (1992) value scale examining 
motivations and goals, then developed a market mentality scale by comparing a power 
and achievement score with benevolence and universalism. Groß, Hövermann, and 
Messner (2018) measured market mentality using Likert scales comparing success and 
power with altruistic values. Success was measured using the questions “It’s not 
important how you win but that you win,” and “The deeds of persons need to be judged 
by their success.” Power was measured by three questions “There are some persons that 
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are of less worth than others,” “Some persons did not deserve better,” “It is just when 
some persons are well off and others are badly off.”  
Because a prior market mentality scale has not been created from the G.R.E.A.T. 
data questions, a factor analysis was used to select the questions most relevant to market 
mentality. Initially eight market mentality questions were selected which represented 
power, egotism, and monetary fetishism. After the factor analysis was performed, which 
is discussed in the results section, the final questions were “If I do things to upset other 
people, it is their problem not mine,” “I try to look out for myself first, even if it means 
making things difficult for other people,” and “I will try to get things I want, even if I 
know it’s causing problems for other people.” The final three market mentality questions 
were all asked on an early likert scale and were recoded on a 0 to 4 scale that was 
summed and averaged (a = .77).1     
The second group of independent variables comprise of various questions to 
measure different types of normative flexibility. Therefore, three types of normative 
flexibility are examined regarding stealing, fighting, and lying to determine which actions 
impacted by normative flexibility are most likely to lead to either property crime, 
fighting, or violent crime. This is because it is unlikely all attitudes impacted by 
normative flexibility contribute equally to delinquent outcomes. The questions selected 
have traditionally been used to measure neutralization. Nine questions ask about when it 
is okay to lie, steal, and beat up someone. The neutralization questions about beating up 
people were included because a number of studies have found marketized individuals 
also engage in higher levels of violence (Stults and Falco, 2013; Groß, et al., 2018). Each 
question was originally measured on a likert scale then recoded to where a 0 equals 
strongly disagree and a 4 equals strongly agree. The first three questions measured 
INSTITUTIONAL ANOMIE AND NORMATIVE FLEXIBILITY 15 
 
 
flexibility of lying (a = .86).2 Flexibility of stealing was also comprised of three questions 
(a = .90).3 Flexibility of fighting was also composed of three questions (a = .88).4 
Control Variables  
This study will also control for self-transcending values, solidarity values, race, 
gender, age, parental education, single parent households, and the nesting of schools 
within cities, and the G.R.E.AT. program because half of participants had participated. 
The first control variable is Altruistic/Self-transcending values. This variable is included 
because from a theoretical conceptualization, self-transcending values are opposite from 
market mentality. This is because market mentality requires prioritizing the individual 
self and material goods above other people, whereas self-transcending values require that 
a person see themselves in others. This scale resembles Hövermann, et al’s., (2016) self 
transcending scale which contained questions about feeling sympathy for others, trying to 
understand others, and imaging how others feel. The current self-transcending scale was 
created with six questions “It feels good to do something without expecting anything in 
return,” “I always do my part,” “My involvement in the community improves others’ 
lives,” Teenagers can make a difference in improving their community,” “I often think 
about how my actions affect other people,” and “I value Being a Team Member” (a = 
.839). Each question was asked on a one to five scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). The questions were recoded on a zero to four scale, the responses were summed, 
and an average was calculated for the final scale. 
The second control variable is solidarity values. This variable is measured using 
four dichotomous variables (0 = no, 1= yes). The items included responses to if 
respondents participated in school, community, religious, or family activities. Each 
solidarity question is treated as a separate measure and will be loaded into the regression 
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models separately. These measures also act as measures of social control as they reflect 
Hirschi’s (1969) dimension of involvement in his social bonding theory.  
Race, gender, age, single parent households, the spatial location of cities, and the 
G.R.E.AT. program are coded as dummy variables. Parental education was measured on 
a likert scale which was recoded so that a 0 means did not complete high school, a 1 
means completed high school, a 2 means completed some college, a 3 means completed 
college, and a 4 means more than college. The average parent had completed some 
college (M = 2.8, SD = 1.2). The average age of participants in the study was 15.45 with 
the youngest participant being 14 years of age, and the oldest participant being 19 years 
of age (M = 15.45, SD = .62). Race included the groups White, Black, Hispanic, Other, 
and Biracial. Whites were the comparison group and were omitted from the analysis. The 
spatial locations of schools included the South West, West, South, Mountain, South East, 
Mid West, and North East. North East was omitted from the analysis because it was the 
comparison group. Because SPSS treats the value 1 as the control group, when running a 
negative binomial regression, males, single parent houses, and those who did not go 
through the G.R.E.A.T. program were assigned a 0. 
In wave six of the G.R.E.A.T survey, 49.2% of participants were male (n = 1,346) 
and 50.7% were female (n = 1,392). Of the 2,748 participants in wave six (N = 2,748), 
Table 1 shows Whites comprised 27.5% of the sample (n = 756), Blacks comprised 
15.6% of the sample (n = 430), Hispanics comprised 39.1% of the sample (n = 1,074), 
Asians comprised 4.8% of the sample (n = 132), the category Other comprised 1.5% of 
the sample (n = 41), 9.2% indicated they were Bi-racial (n = 252), and 1% of respondents 
did not answer (n = 26). 
 
 




Descriptive Statistics of Independent, Mediating, and Dependent Scales  
 N Mean SD Range 
Race     
   White 756 0.27 0.44 0-1 
   Black 430 0.15 0.36 0-1 
   Hispanic 1,074 0.41 0.48 0-1 
   Other  210 0.09 0.12 0-1 
   Biracial 252 0.10 0.28 0-1 
Gender     
   Male 1,346 .492 0.5 1 
   Female 1,392 .507 0.5 0 
Age  2694 15.45 0.62 14-19 
Parental 
Education 
2290 2.13 1.28 0-4 
Market Men. 2738 1.31 .805 0-4 
Flex/Neutral 2738 1.73 .805 0-4 
Attack With 
Weapon 
2738 .19 1.16 0-11 
Fighting 2738 .85 2.22 0-11 
Burglary 2738 .23 1.27 0-11 
Vandalism 2704 .54 1.75 0-11 
Stealing More 
Than $50 
2658 .61 1.93 0-11 
Stealing less 
Than $50 
2704 .26 1.40 0-11 
Location 
   Southwest 
2738 .136 .343 0-1 
   West 2738 .137 .344 0-1 
   South 2738 .168 .374 0-1 
   Mountain 2738 .152 .359 0-1 
   Southeast 2738 .168 .374 0-1 
   Northeast 2738 .117 .322 0-1 
   Midwest 2738 .118 .322 0-1 
 
Analysis Plan  
This study will conduct four sets of analyses which include: constructing a market 
mentality measure from the G.R.E.A.T. data, testing if market mentality is empirically 
distinct and theoretically distinct from normative flexibility, testing if normative 
flexibility predicts market mentality, and performing a series of regressions to determine 
if market mentality mediates normative flexibility and delinquency.  
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 The first analysis will construct a market mentality scale from the G.R.E.A.T. 
data. This is because eight potential market mentality questions have been selected that 
are similar to past questions measuring market mentality. However, while the questions 
may be similar, a factor analysis needs to be performed to ensure the questions load 
together under a single component. To ensure this, a scree plot and factor analysis will be 
utilized to determine which of the eight potential market mentality questions should be 
included for the final analysis. All questions that have an eigenvalue above 1 will be kept 
whereas the questions that have an eigenvalue below 1 will be discarded. The result from 
each remaining question will be summed and averaged to create an overall market 
mentality scale.  
The second analysis will test if market mentality and normative flexibility are 
empirically distinct and theoretically distinct. This assumption will be tested using a 
factor analysis. If normative flexibility is embedded in market mentality, there should be 
a single component or overlap between multiple components. However, if the concepts 
are distinct, the components should not have any overlap, with values for each factor 
being near 1.   
The third analysis will examine if normative flexibility is a significant predictor of 
market mentality. To accomplish this, first a multiple regression analysis will be run to 
determine if normative flexibility predicts market mentality. If normative flexibility does 
not predict market mentality, there will not be a reason for a more advanced test.  
The final analysis will consist of a series of Poisson or negative binomial 
regressions depending on which has the better model fit to determine if market mentality 
and normative flexibility are significantly related to attacking someone with a weapon, 
hitting others, burglary, vandalism, stealing more than $50 dollars, and stealing less than 
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$50 dollars. It is likely a negative binomial model will be utilized because in all of the 
outcomes, the variance is greater than the mean violating an assumption of the Poisson 
distribution (Hutchinson and Holtman, 2005).  
Results 
 To prepare for performing a factor analysis Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
performed to ensure a factor analysis was appropriate for the dataset. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis KMO = .812 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2 (28) = 4,185.76, p < .000, meaning there was enough 
variance in the data to perform a factor analysis.  
To select the market mentality questions, a maximum likelihood factor analysis 
and scree plot with the Kaiser’s criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1 yielded a two-
factor solution as the best fit for the data, accounting for 51.52% of the variance. 
However, the third factor was also included as it had an eigenvalue of .962, and with it, 
the accounted variance increased to 63.54%. Furthermore this variable is theoretically 
relevant to market mentality. The first market mentality factor was “If I do things to upset 
other people, it is their problem not mine.” This factor had an eigenvalue of 2.94 and 
accounted for 36.7% of the variance. The second market mentality factor was “I will try 
to get things I want, even if I know it’s causing problems for other people.” This factor 
had an eigenvalue of 1.18 and accounted for 14.7% of the variance. The third market 
mentality factor included was “I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making 
things difficult for other people.” This factor had an eigenvalue of .962 and could explain 
12% of the variance. “If I do things to upset other people, it is their problem not mine” 
and “I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other 
people” is indicative of excessive individualism. The second question “I will try to get 
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things I want, even if I know it’s causing problems for other people” indicates a mental 
state of valuing possessions over people, which is monetary fetishism. The three 
questions were summed and averaged to create a single market mentality scale (a = .77).     
Once the market mentality questions were selected, an exploratory factor analysis 
was performed. The extraction method utilized principal component analysis and a 
Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization method was used. This yielded a five-
component solution as the best fit for the questions. Because this was the number of 
distinct theoretical concepts that were included, the measurement scales were measuring 
their intended theoretical constructs.   
Table 2 
Rotated Component Matrix for Market Mentality, Flexibility, and Transcending Values 
 
 Component  
         1  2 3 4  5  Dimension 
Feels good to work 
without pay 
.738 -.160 -.050 -.206 -.004 
 
Do part .728 -.076 -.064 -.144 .034 Self 
Involvement in 
comm. helps 
.688 -.026 -.105 .041 -.157 
Transcending 
Values 
I can make a diff. in 
Comm. 
.763 -.101 .013 -.061 -.036 
 
My actions affect 
others 
.719 -.218 -.047 -.048 -.099 
 
Value team 
member .743 -.060 .003 -.167 .025 
 
Look out for self -.134 .763 .133 .077 .152 Market 
Not my problem -.208 .787 .118 .144 .137 Mentality 
Get by any means -.160 .776 .142 .237 .114  
It’s okay tell small 
lie 
-.003 .140 .831 .121 .182 
Flexibility 
Lying 
It’s okay to lie to 
help 
-.094 .118 .819 .233 .246 
 
It’s okay to lie to 
stop trouble -.100 .166 .816 .235 .209 
 
It’s okay to steal 
from rich 
-.156 .160 .245 .829 .157 
Flexibility 
Stealing 
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It’s okay to steal 
from store 
-.179 .157 .196 .865 .150 
 
It’s okay to steal -.170 .181 .167 .828 .202  
It’s okay to fight if 
I’m hit first 
-.087 .172 .216 .163 .816 
Flexibility 
Fighting 
It’s okay to fight 
for rights 
-.028 .157 .183 .166 .862 
 
It’s okay to fight a 
threat 
-.057 .102 .217 .140 .865 
 
Notes. Extraction method; Principal Component Analysis; Rotation method; Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization.   
 
The factor analysis results show that market mentality and normative flexibility 
are empirically distinct as well as theoretically distinct. In addition, there was very little 
overlap between the separate components indicating appropriate questions had been 
selected to represent each theoretical construct. Because these are separate constructs 
attention was turned to determine if neutralization predicts market mentality. 
Regression Results 
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict if neutralization, solidarity 
values, and self-transcending values is a significant predictor of market mentality, while 
controlling for race, gender, age, single parent households, parental education, and the 
nesting of schools within cities. It is predicted that neutralization will be significant in 
predicting market mentality. Table 3 shows the result of the multiple regression model. 
In table 3, a significant regression equation was found (F(25, 2143) = 43.407, p < 
.000) with an R2 of .336. This model indicates for each unit increase in transcending 
values market mentality decreases -.278. All three flexibility measures and transcending 
values were significant predictors of market mentality p  < .000. For each unit increase in 
flexibility of lying, market mentality increases .155, for each unit increase in flexibility 
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stealing, market mentality increases .174, and for each unit increase in flexibility fighting, 




Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Flexibility predicting Market Mentality (N 
= 2,748) 
  Variable    B SE B                 Sig. 
Transcending Values -.278 .027 ***.000 
Flexibility Lie .155 .020 ***.000 
Flexibility Steal .174 .021 ***.000 
Flexibility Fight .109 .015 ***.000 
Age .073 .026 **.006 
Single Parent House .043 .035 .216 
Highest Parent Ed. -.024 .013 .052 
Involve in School Act. -.024 .036 .491 
Involve in Community Act. -.028 .034 .415 
Involve in Religious Act. -.053 .033 .106 
Involve in Family Act. -.052 .036 .144 
Great Participation .010 .030 .726 
Males -.001 .031 .984 
Black .287 .051 ***.000 
Hispanic .057 .042 .182 
Other .081 .136 .554 
Biracial -.005 .056 .923 
Southwest  .029 .060 .629 
West  -.047 .065 .465 
South  .034 .059 .572 
Mountain  .075 .061 .225 
Southeast  .053 .063 .400 
Midwest .120 .064 .059 
G.R.E.A.T. -.010 .030 .739 
                    
                    R2 
     
 .33 
***p  <  .000.  **p  <  .01. *p < .05. 
 
Furthermore, Age was significant at the p < .01 level indicating for each 
additional year of age, market mentality increases .073, and blacks are more likely when 
compared to whites to develop market mentality p < .000.  These results indicate that 
when individuals develop flexibility, they will then go on to adopt a new moral standard 
INSTITUTIONAL ANOMIE AND NORMATIVE FLEXIBILITY 23 
 
 
of market mentality. This provides preliminary evidence that normative flexibility leads 
to market mentality that may then lead to delinquent outcomes.  
To test if market mentality mediates normative flexibility and delinquent 
outcomes, six poisson models were compared with six negative binomial models to 
determine which provided the better fit. For all twelve models, the Akaike Information 
Criterion, Bayesian Information Criterion, and log-likelihood indicated the negative 
binomial models provided the better fit.  
In table 4, twelve negative binomial models were used to examine the effect of 
market mentality and flexibility/neutralization, on attacking someone with a weapon, 
fighting, burglary, vandalism, stealing more than $50 dollars, and stealing less than $50 
dollars. Two models were run for each of the six outcomes. The first models of each 
outcome tested if flexibility regarding lying, stealing and fighting was significant without 
market mentality. The second model of each outcome tested if flexibility would no longer 
be significant after the inclusion of market mentality. Each outcome accounted for a 
significant amount of the variance.




Summary of Negative Binomial Regression Examining Market Mentality and Flexibility 
 Attack with Weapon Fighting Burglary 
Model # 
Variables 
     
      B 
1  
  SE B 
 
    B 
2 
  SE B 
 
     B 
3 
  SE B 
 
     B 
4 
   SE B 
 
    B 
5 
   SE B 
 
    B 
6 
  SE B 
MM -- -- .269 .093** -- -- .404 .049*** -- -- .398 .086*** 
Flex Lie -.082 .090 -.139 .100 .090 .051 .014 .052 -.165 .091 -.246 .093** 
Flex Steal 1.04 .078*** .981 .092*** .452 .045*** .393 .046*** 1.14 .084*** 1.06 .085*** 
Flex Fight .117 .112 .107 .078 .419 .039*** .385 .039*** .024 .069 -.002 .069 
Transcend -.565 .152*** -.531 .114*** -.360 .065*** -.275 .067*** -.516 .103*** -.464 .104*** 
Family 
Solidarity 
-.465 .156** -.476 .153** -.016 .083 .012 .084 -.129 .142 -.127 .144 
School 
Solidarity  
-.568 .167*** -.540 .157*** -.061 .082 -.046 .083 -.344 .142** -.305 .144* 
Comm. 
Solidarity 
.276 .156 .290 .168 -.076 .083 -.041 .084 .406 .148** .428 .150** 
Religion 
Solidarity 
.363 .056* .358 .156* .192 .080** .210 .081** .193 .140 .186 .141 
Parent Ed. -.102 .147 -.090 .056 .005 .029 .007 .029 .017 .049 .023 .049 
Single 
Parent. 
.215 .098 .220 .148 .127 .079 .170 .080 .357 .131** .371 .131* 
Age .597 .147*** .570 .098*** .092 .059 .037 .060 .335 .092*** .295 .092*** 
Males .667 .214*** .659 .148*** -.021 .074 -.019 .074 .738 .133*** .719 .134*** 
Black .579 .194** .558 .215** .450 .113*** .358 .114** .285 .191 .236 .193 
Hispanic -.288 .297 -.310 .194 -.350 .105*** -.392 .106*** -.505 .174** -.516 .176** 
Biracial -.276 .398 -.227 .299 .079 .130 .153 .132 .200 .226 .215 .229 
Other -.530 .299 -.472 .401 -.616 .188*** -.544 .189** -.267 .318 -.228 .320 
South W -.828 .302** -.776 .300** -.233 .139 -.173 .141 -.427 .280 -.332 .283 
West .147 .234 .259 .305 -.448 .146** -.316 .148* .121 .269 .332 .274 
South .447 .259 .511 .236* -.072 .128 .018 .130 .957 .221*** 1.06 .226*** 
Mountain .622 .275* .695 .261** -.475 .146*** -.410 .147** .501 .255* .585 .258* 
South E -.280 .243 -.302 .277 -.373 .135** -.303 .136* -.333 .261 -.281 .265 
Mid W .191 .132 .264 .244 -.218 .140 -.090 .142 .712 .237** .820 .239*** 
Great -.146 .099 -.141 .133 -.029 .071 -.025 .072 -.227 .119 -.211 .120 
***p  <  .000.  **p  <  .01. *p < .05. 
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Table 4 Cont. 
Summary of Negative Binomial Regression Examining Market Mentality and Flexibility 
Vandalism 
 
Stealing More than $50 
 




      
     B 
7 
   SE B 
 
     B 
8 
  SE B 
 
    B 
9 
 SE B 
 
    B 
10 
  SE B 
 
    B 
11 
 SE B 
 
    B 
12 
  SE B 
MM -- --  .377 .060*** -- -- .345 .086*** -- -- .182 .061** 
Flex Lie -.030 .063 -.104 .064 -.334 .093*** -.395 .095*** .014 .063*** -.030 .064 
Flex Steal .878 .056*** .800 .058*** 1.45 .090*** 1.36 .092*** 1.09 .060*** 1.07 .061*** 
Flex Fight .252 .049*** .221 .049*** .080 .070 .068 .070 .197 .049* .179 .049*** 
Transcend -.485 .076*** -.431 .078*** -.535 .100*** -.522 .101*** -.157 .077* -.102 .079 
Family 
Solidarity 
-.060 .100 -.038 .101 -.240 .140 -.252 .141 -.120 .099 -.122 .099 
School 
Solidarity  
-.008 .101 .006 .102 -.445 .137*** -.451 .138*** -.416 .098*** -.410 .099*** 
Comm. 
Solidarity 
.161 .102 .172 .103 .083 .147 .132 .148 .347 .102*** .365 .103*** 
Religion 
Solidarity 
.245 .096** .261 .096** .554 .138*** .560 .139*** .231 .095** .238 .096** 
Parent Ed. -.009 .036 -.005 .036 -.055 .050 -.040 .050 -.028 .035 -.027 .035 
Single 
Parent. 
.318 .097** .351 .098*** .512 .128*** .523 .128*** .233 .093** .224 .093** 
Age .060 .067 .027 .068 .155 .088 .117 .089 .029 .068 .018 .069 
Males .507 .090*** .520 .091*** .475 .128*** .463 .129*** .259 .090** .262 .090** 
Black -.154 .151 -.269 .153 -.162 .198 -.225 .201 -.210 .151 -.257 .152 
Hispanic -.013 .122 -.046 .123 -.326 .170* -.360 .170* -.067 .121 -.044 .121 
Biracial -.132 .168 -.076 .169 .166 .226 .148 .228 .360 .151** .364 .151** 
Other -.276 .214 -.222 .215 -.267 .300 -.168 .301 .193 .186 .183 .186 
South W -.024 .175 .012 .177 -.837 .253** -.569 .255* -.001 .176 -.097 .177 
West -.358 .191 -.248 .193 -.525 .259 -.203 .263 .213 .177 .175 .179 
South .108 .164 .182 .167 .082 .215 .360 .218 .351 .164* .257 .165** 
Mountain .119 .173 .156 .175 .223 .229 .484 .231* .142 .176 .039 .177 
South E -.478 .180** -.442 .182* -.334 .247** -.614 .249** -.446 .182** -.545 .182* 
Mid W .023 .178 .112 .179 -- -- .419 .233 .200 .178 -- -- 
Great .158 .086 .147 .087 -.155 .116 -- -- .169 .084* .176 .084* 
***p  <  .000.  **p  <  .01. *p < .05. 
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  Out of the three flexibility measures, flexibility in stealing had the strongest 
coefficients that were significant for eleven of the twelve outcomes. Unsurprisingly, 
flexibility in stealing had the strongest effects on stealing outcomes such as burglary, 
stealing more than $50, and stealing less than $50. It also had a strong coefficient on 
attacking someone with a weapon. For example, in model 1, the coefficient was 1.04. 
This means given that the other variables are held constant, if an adolescent were to 
increase their flexibility in stealing score by one point, the difference in the logs of 
expected counts would be expected to increase by 1.04 units. When converted to an 
incident rate ratio, for each unit increase in flexibility of stealing, attacking someone with 
a weapon would be expected to increase by a factor of 2.851, while holding all other 
variables in the model constant.  
  In regards to the variable flexibility of fighting, it had the strongest effect on 
fighting out of all the outcomes. Yet, this effect was still smaller than flexibility of 
stealing. This means for model 3, for each unit increase in flexibility of fighting, the 
incident rate ratio for the outcome fighting would be expected to increase by a factor of 
1.571. Flexibility of fighting had the smallest coefficient on model 12, stealing less than 
$50, at .179. This means for model 12, for each unit increase in flexibility of fighting, the 
incident ratio for the outcome stealing less than $50 would be expected to increase by a 
factor of 1.197, while holding all other variables constant.  
 Flexibility in attitudes regarding lying was significant in only four outcomes. The 
only outcome were flexibility in lying contributed to an increase in delinquency was 
stealing less than $50 dollars, however the increase for the difference in the logs of 
expected counts was small at .014. This means for every one unit increase in flexibility of 
lying in adolescents, the incident rate ratio for stealing less than $50 would be expected to 
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increase by a factor of 1.018, while holding all other variables in the model constant. 
Interestingly, flexibility of lying was negatively associated with the outcome burglary for 
model 6, and the outcome stealing more than $50 dollars for both models. This indicates 
as flexibility in lying increases in adolescents, they will be less likely to steal something 
worth more than $50 dollars. For example in model 10, given that the other variables are 
held constant, if an adolescent were to increase their flexibility in lying score by one 
point, the difference in the logs of expected counts would be expected to decrease by .334 
units. When converted to an incident rate ratio, for each unit increase in flexibility of 
lying, stealing more than $50 dollars would be expected to decrease by a factor of .673, 
while holding all other variables in the model constant.  
 Market mentality was significant in each of the six outcomes. Market mentality 
had the strongest coefficient for fighting at .404. When converted to an incident rate ratio, 
for each unit increase in market mentality in adolescents, their rate for fighting would be 
expected to increase by a factor of 1.498, while holding all other variables in the model 
constant. Market mentality had the weakest coefficient for stealing less than $50 at .182. 
When converted to an incident rate ratio, for each unit increase in market mentality in 
adolescents, their rate for stealing less than $50 would be expected to increase by a factor 
of 1.199, while holding all other variables in the model constant.  
 There were multiple instances in which the flexibility measures were significant 
depending on whether market mentality was included in the model or not. For example, 
flexibility regarding lying was only significant in one of the models of the outcomes 
burglary and stealing less than $50, and either lost or gained significance when market 
mentality was included. The same was true for flexibility of fighting regarding stealing 
less than $50. Overall, the market mentality results were consistent with the past two 
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pieces of research that have examined market mentality in adolescents (Stults and Falco, 
2013; Groß et al., 2018). However, there was not evidence that market mentality is a 
mediating variable as the results for flexibility were similar after market mentality was 
included. Therefore this study has failed to reject the null hypothesis that market 
mentality mediates normative flexibility and property crime and violent crime.  
 For the control variables, transcending values were negatively associated with ten 
out of the twelve delinquent outcomes. This means the higher the level transcending 
values were in adolescents, the less likely they were to engage in the delinquent 
outcomes. Transcending values had the strongest protective effect on attacking someone 
with a weapon. This means, when an incident rate ratio is calculated, if an adolescent 
were to increase their transcending values by a one unit increase, their rate for attacking 
someone with a weapon would be expected to decrease by a factor of 1.309, while 
holding all other variables in the model constant.  
 Several of the solidarity measures had surprising results. For example, while 
involvement in school showed protective effects across nearly all outcomes, religious 
involvement contributed to delinquent outcomes for adolescents. This is a surprising 
finding as multiple studies have found the opposite for religious influence (Donahue and 
Benson, 1995; Shina, Cnaan, and Gelles, 2007; Petts, 2009). Initially this outcome was 
assumed to be a coding error, and was rechecked with the original data, however, the 
results remained the same. Because of this, the validity of the solidarity measures is in 
question.  
 Single parent families were not a risk factor for violent crimes, but they were for 
property crimes such as burglary, vandalism, stealing more than $50, and stealing less 
than $50. Older participants indicated they were more likely to be involved in the 
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outcomes attacking someone with a weapon p ≤ .001 or burglary p ≤ .001  (model 5). 
Males were more likely than females to partake in attacking someone with a weapon, 
burglary, vandalism, and stealing more or less than $50. Black participants were more 
likely than whites to engage in attacking someone with a weapon and burglary (model 6). 
Hispanics were less likely than whites to be involved in fighting and burglary. 
Participants who indicated they were biracial were more likely than whites to steal less 
than $50 p ≤ .01. Attacking someone with a weapon was less likely to occur in the 
Southwest as compared to the Northeast p ≤ .01. Burglary was more likely to occur in the 
south than the northeast p ≤ .001. In regard to the dummy variables, the category white 
and northeast were omitted from the study results as they were treated as the comparison 
groups. In addition, the variable Midwest was not included in model 9 and 12, and 
participation in the Great program was not included in model 10, as these variables 
resulted in a failure for the negative binomial regression to converge.   
Discussion 
Prior research has considered normative flexibility to be embedded within market 
mentality. This paper provided evidence with a factor analysis this is not the case and 
instead market mentality and normative flexibility are empirically distinct as well as 
theoretically distinct. However, the hypothesis claimed that Market mentality mediates 
the relationship between normative flexibility and delinquency however this hypothesis 
was not supported. This is because the results for flexibility were similar even after 
market mentality was included. This indicates both market mentality and normative 
flexibility are pathways leading to delinquent outcomes.   
While this paper failed to reject its null hypothesis, it does confirm Messner, et 
al’s., (2008) hypothesis which has never been fully tested. Messner et al (2008) stated in 
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a discussion of IAT, “that the likelihood of criminal violence will be high when actors are 
not particularly sensitive to the moral status of the means of action.” The results show 
that if a person possesses both normative flexibility and market mentality then the 
likelihood of criminal action is increased. Therefore, both market mentality and 
normative flexibility directly contribute to delinquent outcomes. However, neutralization 
does not only increase the risk for delinquency, but it also can create a pathway for 
individuals to develop market mentality as the results in table three suggest. Therefore it 
appears neutralization can lead to market mentality, which then leads to delinquency, but 
it can also lead to delinquency in and of itself.   
The findings from table 3 that the risks of market mentality increases as 
adolescents get older, and that neutralization is a significant predictor of market mentality 
is important. This is because it may provide clinicians with a method to prevent the 
development of market mentality through treating neutralizations, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of criminal activities.  
IAT may have provided an important clue as to how techniques of neutralization 
develop. Sykes and Matza (1957) thought the techniques are learned, yet, IAT predicts 
normative flexibility occurs due to a weakening of social controls. As was explained 
earlier, anomie encourages individuals to neutralize the traditional moral standard that 
has been weakened and develop market values. Because of this, in a marketized society, 
it may be that Matza’s (1964) techniques of neutralization create a natural pathway that 
allows individuals to develop market mentality. If such a process occurs, anomie may 
make it easier to adopt and apply techniques of neutralization to a variety of different 
behaviors, and thereby lead to market mentality. However, this is still an open question, 
and an avenue for future research to explore with longitudinal data. 
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 Another area for future research is examining how multiple types of 
neutralizations impact market mentality and delinquency. There are multiple types of 
neutralizations (Kaptein and Helvoort, 2018), and they likely lead to various outcomes 
depending on specific situations.  
This study examined only three neutralizations and the results suggest market mentality 
and flexibility have different outcomes for different types of delinquency. For example, 
There were several instances in which the flexibility measures were significant depending 
on whether market mentality was included or not. This indicates market mentality and 
neutralizations have different types of direct effects on the other.  
 A final area for future research is to examine solidarity values and self-
transcending values as interaction effects. This is because according to IAT as social 
controls weaken, and normative flexibility is developed, solidarity levels and self-
transcending levels continue to decrease as market mentality increases. As a result, 
solidarity levels and self-transcending values ultimately impact delinquent outcomes. 
Therefore, the examining the interaction effects using structural equation modeling would 
provide a more complete picture of the process IAT describes.  
 Limitations  
 This study was not without multiple limitations. The first major limitation of this 
study is that it is not a true test of mediation because this study did not use longitudinal 
data. Before any conclusions can be drawn, future research needs to use longitudinal data 
to determine if a weakening of social controls leads to an increase of neutralizations, then 
if neutralization leads to market mentality. Until this can be confirmed the results should 
be interpreted with caution.  
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 An additional limitation was that this study lacked a variety of social control 
measures. IAT clearly states the penetration of market values into noneconomic 
institutions weakens social controls. Therefore, the inclusion of different types of social 
controls as control variables would have made for a stronger study.    
 Another limitation was that this study used the terms normative flexibility and 
neutralization interchangeably, which may be confusing for readers. However this points 
to a larger issue where a discussion needs to occur amongst IAT scholars whether the 
term normative flexibility should be abandoned in the IAT literature in favor of 
techniques of neutralization. There are multiple forms of neutralizations that have been 
discussed in the literature, and there has been a debate about the abundance of terms 
(Henry, 1976; LI Chi-mei, 2008). Because of this neutralization scholars are warning this 
will present problems for future researchers (Mauruna and Copes, 2005). Such a 
discussion needs to occur in the IAT literature as normative flexibility, moral flexibility 
and neutralization are used interchangeably, and this may lead to inconsistent research 
findings.  
Conclusion 
 This paper has contributed to the existing literature on IAT in a number of ways. 
The first contribution shows that market mentality and normative flexibility are both 
empirically distinct as well as theoretically distinct. This paper then was able to show that 
flexibility is a significant predictor of neutralization. Finally, the results on a series of 
negative binomial regressions suggest flexibility and market mentality seem to both have 
direct effects on the other as there were multiple instances in which the flexibility 
measures were significant depending on whether market mentality was included in the 
model or not. Overall, however, the results show that neutralization and market mentality 
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both contribute to delinquent outcomes. Finally, this paper found support for Messner, et 
al’s., (2008) hypothesis that the risk of criminal activity is greatest in those who have 
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1 When the factor analysis was run on the eight market mentality questions, two 
components were detected. The first component included the questions, look out for self, 
not sympathetic to others, when I make others upset its not my problem, and get by any 
means. The second component included the questions, avoid paying for things, people act 
out of self-interest, and I only work for pay. However, the eigen values for the questions 
in the second component were lower than those for component 1.  
− The three market mentality questions that were used for the paper are part of 
Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arnekley’s (1993) scale measuring self-centeredness.  
2 “It's okay to tell a small lie if it doesn't hurt anyone," “It's okay to lie if it will 
keep your friends from getting in trouble with parents, teachers, or police.” “It's okay to 
lie to someone if it will keep you out of trouble with them.”  
3 “It's okay to steal something from someone who is rich and can easily replace 
it.” “It's okay to take little things from a store without paying for them since stores make 
so much money that it won't hurt them.” “It's okay to steal something if that's the only 
way you could ever get it.”  
4 “It's okay to beat up someone if they hit you first” “It's okay to beat up someone 
if you have to stand up for or protect your rights.” “It's okay to beat up someone if they 
are threatening to hurt your friends or family.”
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